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Th is paper examines the legal tools that may be available to patients with rare diseases 
seeking to compel Canadian governments to provide funding for required or desired 
treatments. In making health care coverage decisions, governments must decide whether 
to extend funding to cover potentially expensive treatments that benefi t relatively few 
people, particularly when those treatments are experimental. If particular treatments 
are not covered by health insurance, patients with rare diseases may turn to the courts 
with claims based in constitutional, human rights, administrative, international or tort 
law, in an eff ort to compel the government to provide funding. Strategies that employ 
the courts in this way are unlikely to be successful, as courts tend to defer to government 
on these types of policy-driven decisions.
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I.  Introduction
Canadian patients with rare diseases may face unanticipated barriers in pursuit of treatment. Given the plethora of diagnostic 
challenges associated with rare diseases, patients may go undiagnosed 
or misdiagnosed for years.1 If and when they are correctly diagnosed, 
eff ective treatment may not exist, as characteristics of rare diseases may 
render the study of these illnesses and the development of medication 
diffi  cult or unprofi table.2 Even if treatment is available, it may not 
1. Erik Tambuyzer, “Rare Diseases, Orphan Drugs and their Regulation: Questions 
and Misconceptions” (2010) 9 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 921 at 921; 
Paola Pierucci et al, “A Long Diagnostic Delay in Patients with Hereditary 
Haemorrhagic Telangiectasia: A Questionnaire-Based Retrospective Study” 
(2012) 7:33 Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (epub). 
2. Erika F Augustine, Heather R Adams & Jonathan W Mink, “Clinical Trials 
in Rare Disease: Challenges and Opportunities” (2013) 28:9 Journal of Child 
Neurology 1142; Tambuyzer, ibid at 922; John Forman et al, “Th e Need for 
Worldwide Policy and Action Plans for Rare Diseases” (2012) 101:8 Acta 
Paediatrica 805 at 805. Drug developers have tended to neglect rare diseases, 
opting to focus on developing medications for more common diseases, though 
many countries have introduced policies and legislation intended to stimulate 
research in this area: Samir Gupta, “Rare Diseases: Canada’s ‘Research Orphans’” 
(2012) 6:1 Open Medicine e23 at e23-e26; Abbas H Panju & Chaim M 
Bell, “Policy Alternatives for Treatments for Rare Diseases” (2010) 182:17 
Canadian Medical Association Journal E787; Mae Th amer, Niall Brennan & 
Rafael Semansky, “A Cross-National Comparison of Orphan Drug Policies: 
Implications for the US Orphan Drug Act” (1998) 23:2 J Health Pol 265. 
319(2015) 1 CJCCL
be covered by the public health care system and the cost may put the 
treatment out of reach for many patients.3 
Th e recent controversy surrounding the drug eculizumab (brand 
name Soliris) provides a helpful example. Th e drug was approved by 
Health Canada as treatment for two rare diseases: paroxysmal nocturnal 
hemoglobinuria (PNH) and atypical hemolytic uremic syndrome 
(aHUS).4 Th e drug, with a price tag of about half a million dollars every 
year for each patient, is very expensive.5 Th e Canadian Drug Expert 
Committee, which makes suggestions to provinces regarding which drugs 
should be covered by their health insurance plans, recommended in both 
cases that the drug not be funded. In the case of PNH, the Committee 
believed the cost was too high, and in the case of aHUS, the Committee 
doubted the effi  cacy of the drug.6 In 2011, the provincial governments 
coordinated to cover Soliris for PNH.7 However, provincial health 
plans, for the most part, do not cover Soliris for aHUS.8 As this case 
demonstrates, patients with rare diseases may face agonizing uncertainty 
and disappointment about the scope of coverage. Coverage of a particular 
3. Media reports frequently feature personal stories of patients in need of 
medication not covered by the public system. See e.g. Sarah O’Donnell, “Family 
Wins Drug-Cost Coverage”, Edmonton Journal (13 August 2013) A1; Joanne 
Laucius, “Rare Condition Could Leave 12-year-old a Drug Orphan”, Ottawa 
Citizen (5 August 2013) online: Ottawa Citizen <http://www.ottawacitizen.
com>; “North Vancouver Man Denied Life-Saving Drug”, CBC News (10 April 
2011) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news>.
4. Health Canada, “Product Monograph: Soliris (eculizumab)” (25 May 2009), 
online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca>; Laucius, ibid. An estimated 
90 people in Canada have PNH: Sam Cooper, “Drug-Funding Agreement Gives 
Rare Disease Patients New Hope”, Edmonton Journal (26 July 2011) A2.
5. Laucius, supra note 3.
6. Canadian Drug Expert Committee, “CDEC Final Recommendation: 
Eculizumab: (Soliris – Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc.) New Indication: Atypical 
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome” (18 July 2013), online: Canadian Agency for 
Drugs and Technologies in Health <http://www.cadth.ca>; Canadian Expert 
Drug Advisory Committee, “CEDAC Final Recommendation: Eculizumab: 
(Soliris – Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc.) Indication: Paroxysmal Nocturnal 
Hemoglobinuria” (19 February 2010), online: Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health <http://www.cadth.ca>.
7. Cooper, supra note 4. 
8. Laucius, supra note 3 (it appears that Soliris may be covered for aHUS in 
Quebec).
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medication may be extended only to certain groups of patients and denied 
to others. Furthermore, a “coverage patchwork” may develop across the 
country, leading to a situation where a particular medication is publicly 
funded in one province but not covered in adjacent provinces.9 
Th is paper focuses on health care access challenges faced by patients 
with rare diseases. A disease is a “rare disease” if it aff ects only a small 
segment of the overall population, typically defi ned as 1 in 2,000 people.10 
Although individual rare diseases aff ect only a small number of people, 
over 5 per cent of the total population has a rare disease.11 
As the above example of Soliris illustrates, in a publicly funded health 
care system like Canada’s, hard questions arise: Which treatments should 
be covered, and for whom? Who should pay for people with rare diseases 
to receive expensive drugs? How should governments choose to allocate 
scarce health resources? Th is paper will not provide a normative answer to 
these questions. Rather, it focuses on a diff erent, yet related, problem that 
arises after these questions have been answered and funding decisions 
have been implemented: Do patients with rare diseases who are denied 
public health insurance coverage for desired treatments have recourse to 
the courts?   
Th is paper reviews legal mechanisms available to patients with rare 
diseases who seek to establish entitlement to publicly funded medical 
treatment. It begins with an overview of how coverage decisions are made 
in Canada’s public health care system. Th is is followed by a consideration 
of diff erent legal avenues – constitutional, administrative, human rights, 
international, and tort – and an assessment of their potential for success. 
Th roughout the following discussion, one issue that arises repeatedly 
is the effi  cacy of the medication in question. Sometimes the treatment 
sought by patients will be proven to be eff ective and, in the case of a 
drug, approved by Health Canada. At other times, patients may seek 
9. Jamie R Daw & Steven G Morgan “Stitching the Gaps in the Canadian Public 
Drug Coverage Patchwork? A Review of Provincial Pharmacare Policy Changes 
from 2000 to 2010” (2012) 104:1 Health Policy 19; Wendy J Ungar & Maciej 
Witkos, “Public Drug Plan Coverage for Children Across Canada: A Portrait of 
Too Many Colours” (2005) 1:1 Healthcare Policy 100.
10. Gupta, supra note 2 at e23. 
11. Ibid at e26.
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unproven or unapproved12 treatments or drugs.13 While many of the legal 
issues pertinent to these two circumstances overlap, the latter situation 
presents unique challenges. For example, if there is no scientifi c evidence 
establishing that a particular drug is an eff ective treatment for a particular 
disease, then the patient seeking access to that drug may be unable to 
satisfy his or her burden to prove the requisite elements of the claim. Th e 
issue of how medical effi  cacy may aff ect the outcome of a particular claim 
is addressed when germane to the discussion below. 
II.  Overview of Health Care Coverage Decision-  
 Making
As a condition of federal subsidy under the Canada Health Act,14 
provincial health insurance plans must cover “medically required” 
“physician services”15 and “medically necessary” “hospital services.”16 
Th e contours of “medically necessary” – and thus what services must 
be covered – are not fl eshed out in the federal act or in the provincial 
health acts which establish and operationalize provincial health care 
12. Under schemes set up by the provinces and the federal government, patients are 
able to obtain unapproved drugs in certain circumstances.  A detailed description 
of these processes and the decision-making that occurs under them is outside the 
scope of this paper. For more information, see Timothy KS Christie, Marianne 
Harris & Julio SG Montaner, “Special Access Denied: A Case Study of Health 
Canada’s Special Access Program” (2006) 2:2 Health Policy 27; Health Canada, 
“Special Access Programme – Drugs”, online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.
gc.ca/dhp-mps/acces/drugs-drogues/sapfs_pasfd_2002-eng.php>.
13. See Simon Day, “Evidence-Based Medicine and Rare Diseases” in Manuel 
Posada de la Paz & Stephen C Groft, eds, Rare Diseases Epidemiology: Advances 
in Experimental Medicine and Biology, vol 686 (New York: Springer, 2010) 41 
(“most new experimental treatments sadly do not work – or, even if they do 
work, their overall benefi t-risk balance is not positive” at 44).
14. RSC 1985, c C-6 [CHA].
15. Ibid, s 2.
16. Ibid.
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themes.17 Despite the fertile academic literature on this issue,18 case 
law exploring and developing the term is sparse, leading to the rather 
unhelpful conclusion that “medically necessary” hospital and physician 
services are those that governments ultimately decide to cover under their 
public insurance plans.19
Given that these decisions are not based on legislative guidelines, 
it is important that patients who intend to challenge the scope of 
public health care coverage understand how these decisions are made. 
Th e manner of decision-making varies greatly depending on the sort 
of service in issue.20 Coverage for physician services, for example, is 
determined through “negotiation between a provincial government and 
17. Colleen M Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, “What Is In and Out of 
Medicare? Who Decides?” in Colleen M Flood, ed, Just Medicare: What’s In, 
What’s Out, How We Decide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 15 at 
17; Timothy Caulfi eld, “Wishful Th inking: Defi ning Medically Necessary in 
Canada” (1996) 4 Health LJ 63 at 67 [Caulfi eld, “Wishful Th inking”].
18. See e.g. Caulfi eld, “Wishful Th inking”, ibid; Louise R Sweatman & Diane 
Woollard, “Resource Allocation Decisions in Canada’s Health Care System: 
Can Th ese Decisions Be Challenged in a Court of Law” (2002) 62 Health 
Policy 275; Cathy Charles et al, “Medical Necessity in Canadian Health Policy: 
Four Meanings and…a Funeral?” (1997) 75:3 Th e Milbank Quarterly 365 
at 370; Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, ibid; Commission on the Future of Health 
Care in Canada, Medically Necessary: What is it, and Who Decides? (Ottawa: 
2002), online: Canadian Foundation for Healthcare Improvement <http://
www.cfhi-fcass.ca/Home.aspx>; Donna Greschner, “Charter Challenges and 
Evidence-Based Decision-Making in the Health Care System: Towards a 
Symbiotic Relationship” in Colleen M Flood, ed, Just Medicare: What’s In, What’s 
Out, How We Decide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 42; Sara 
Rosenbaum et al, “Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically 
Necessary?” (1999) 340 Th e New England Journal of Medicine 229. See also the 
Honourable Michael JL Kirby, Th e Health of Canadians – Th e Federal Role: Final 
Report (Ottawa: Th e Standing Senate Committee on Social Aff airs, Science and 
Technology, 2002), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca>.
19. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 16-18; Colleen M Flood & Michelle 
Zimmerman, “Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource Decisions and the 
Supreme Court of Canada” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health 
Law at the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 25 at 29-30; 
Caulfi eld, “Wishful Th inking”, supra note 17 at 63-67, 74-77; Kirby, ibid at Vol 
6, Part VIII, Chapter 17; Mel Cousins, “Health Care and Human Rights after 
Auton and Chaoulli” (2009) 54:4 McGill LJ 717 at 719.
20. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 17.
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its respective medical association.”21 By way of contrast, the process of 
decision-making for drug coverage tends to be more formalized.22 Under 
the terms of the Canada Health Act, provinces must fund “drugs …
administered in the hospital”23 and may (partially or fully) cover other 
prescription drugs as well.24 Provincial drug coverage decisions are steered 
by the recommendations of the Common Drug Review, which bases its 
advice on reviews of effi  cacy and a cost-benefi t analysis. 25 
Once a coverage decision is made, the ability of patients to 
challenge the decision is limited. Some provinces provide internal 
review mechanisms, whereby health department employees can review 
coverage decisions in response to patient requests.26 In certain provinces, 
administrative tribunals may be authorized to decide matters that touch 
on public health care funding.27 For example, administrative boards play 
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. CHA, supra note 14, s 2. 
24. Kirby, supra note 18 at Vol 6, Part IV, Chapter 7.
25. Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health, “About the Common 
Drug Review” (2015), online: CADTH <http://www.cadth.ca> (“[t]he CADTH 
Common Drug Review … is a pan-Canadian process for conducting objective, 
rigorous reviews of the clinical eff ectiveness and cost-eff ectiveness, as well as 
reviews of patient input for drugs”). See also Pan-Canadian Oncology Drug 
Review, “About the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review” (2011), online: 
pCODR <http://www.pcodr.ca>. For information on the process of drug 
approval and price setting, see Amir Attaran, “Take Your Medicine?: Th e Risk of 
Patient-Led Legislation in Canada’s Medicine Access System” (2009) 3:1 McGill 
JL & Health 3 at 5; Steven Morgan et al, “Breadth, Depth and Agreement 
among Provincial Formularies in Canada” (2009) 4:4 Healthcare Policy e162; 
Natalie de Paulsen, “Th e Regulatory Gap: Off -Label Drug Use in Canada” 
(2005) 63:2 UT Fac L Rev 183 at 189. See also Food and Drug Regulations, CRC 
c 870, s C.08.004; Patented Medicines Regulations, SOR/94-688; Patent Act, RSC 
1985, c P-4, ss 79-103; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “How 
Drugs Are Approved: Funding Decisions” (27 June 2012), online: Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care <http://www.health.gov.on.ca>.
26. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 22-29; Nola M Ries & Timothy 
Caulfi eld, “Accountability in Health Care and Legal Approaches” (3 May 2004), 
Health Care Accountability Paper prepared for the Canadian Policy Research 
Networks (Ottawa, Ontario) at 12, online: Canadian Policy Research Networks 
<http://www.cprn.org/documents/28717_en.pdf>.
27. Flood & Zimmerman, supra note 19 at 34-35; Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra 
note 17 at 23-25.
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a key role in determining whether residents will be reimbursed for health 
care costs incurred out-of-province.28 If these internal mechanisms are 
not successful, patients may seek the intervention of the courts through 
a variety of avenues, a review of which forms the remaining body of this 
paper. 
III. Legal Mechanisms to Challenge Health Care   
 Coverage Decisions
A.  Th e Charter 
In the years immediately following the adoption of the Charter,29 some 
scholars suggested that it should be interpreted so as to provide protection 
for socio-economic rights, including the right to health care.30 Such an 
interpretation would provide fertile ground to argue that the right to 
access particular therapies fell within its ambit. However, Charter claims 
seeking health care entitlements have been mostly unsuccessful to date.31 
Patients with rare diseases seeking to use the Charter to challenge 
health care coverage decisions have two potential avenues of argument. 
First, patients could argue that their section 7 “right[s] to life, liberty 
and security of the person” are unjustifi ably infringed by legislation that 
limits access to medical services.32 Second, patients could argue that the 
government failed to live up to obligations created by either section 7 or 
section 15 of the Charter.33 
Using the fi rst avenue, patients may argue that legislation which 
removes or narrows medical options available to them contravenes 
28. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 25.
29. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
30. See e.g. Martha Jackman, “Th e Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter” 
(1988) 20:2 Ottawa L Rev 257; Martha Jackman, “Charter Review as a Health 
Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada” (2010) 18 Health LJ 1 at 15, 20 
[Jackman, “Charter Review”].
31. Cousins, supra note 19 at 721; Colleen M Flood, Lance Gable & Lawrence O 
Gostin, “Introduction: Legislating and Litigating Health Care Rights Around the 
World” (2005) 33:4 JL Med & Ethics 636 at 638.
32. Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26 at 1-2, 8-9.
33. Ibid at 3.
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section 7 of the Charter.34 Th is avenue contemplates legislation which 
expressly prohibits patients from obtaining certain treatments or medical 
services, such as the kind of legislation that was at issue in Chaoulli.35 
In that case, a Quebec statute provided that patients could not obtain 
private health insurance for medical services available within the public 
health care system.36 A patient challenged the constitutionality of this 
legislation, arguing that the lengthy “delays resulting from waiting 
lists”37 in the public health system combined with removal of the option 
to obtain private insurance negatively impacted his health and thus 
infringed his section 7 rights to life and security of the person. Th ree of 
the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed, fi nding further that 
the legislation was arbitrary and thus inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice.38 One justice preferred to decide the case under the 
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms39 and the three remaining 
justices upheld the provision under the Canadian Charter.40
Patients with rare diseases will fi nd Chaoulli of limited help, however, 
as their access to health care is impeded not by legislation that prohibits 
them from accessing certain services, but rather, by government inaction 
(e.g. not paying for necessary medical treatments or procedures). What 
is needed, from the perspective of patients with rare diseases, is a hook 
on which government obligation to fund treatment can be hung. Th e 
approach discussed below provides a more promising means to fashion 
such a hook.
34. Ibid at 9-12. See e.g. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30; Rodriguez v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519; Jane Doe v Manitoba, 2004 
MBQB 285, rev’d by 2005 MBCA 109.
35. Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35 [Chaoulli]; Ries & Caulfi eld, 
supra note 26 at 10-11.
36. Ibid at para 2.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at para 104. 
39. RSQ c C-12.
40. As many scholars have noted, it is unclear exactly how Chaoulli will impact 
constitutional claims to health care, given the split decision. Th e decision has 
also received negative commentary. See e.g. Jennifer Llewellyn, “A Healthy 
Conception of Rights? Th inking Relationally About Rights in a Health Care 
Context” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health Law at the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 57 at 77.
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In theory, governmental obligation may be created by either sections 
7 or 15 of the Charter. In practice, however, courts have shied away from 
recognizing positive obligations under section 7 of the Charter. Th e 
Supreme Court of Canada has stated that “[t]he Charter does not confer 
a freestanding constitutional right to health care.”41 And, lower courts 
have similarly dismissed suggestions that the government is in violation 
of section 7 when it declines to cover the costs of a particular medical 
treatment.42 
Patients with rare diseases must then look to section 15 and the 
right to equality to establish any funding obligation. A section 15 
analysis requires a court to ask: “(1) Does the law create a distinction 
based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction 
create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?”43 As 
the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he focus of the inquiry is on the 
actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, 
economic and historical factors concerning the group” and “involves 
looking at the circumstances of members of the group and the negative 
impact of the law on them.”44
Accordingly, a patient with a rare disease must establish that the 
refusal to pay for a particular medical service draws a “distinction [that] 
create[s] a disadvantage.”45 Th e patient may point to the fact that the 
health care scheme created by federal and provincial legislation draws 
a distinction between insured and non-insured services, leading to 
diff erential treatment between patients whose medical care is covered and 
those whose medical care is not. Th e patient may further point to the 
fact that some of those in the latter group will include patients with rare 
diseases. It is not obvious on the face of the scheme that the distinction 
is drawn on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground – in this 
41. Chaoulli, supra note 35 at para 104. See also Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 
2002 SCC 84.
42. See Flora v Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 [Flora]; Cousins, 
supra note 19 at 721-26.
43. Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 324 [Quebec v A]; R v Kapp, 
2008 SCC 41 at para 17 [Kapp]; Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 
12 at para 30 [Withler].
44. Withler, ibid at paras 37, 39.
45. Ibid at para 30.
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case, rare disease or disability – as both those with rare diseases and those 
without rare diseases are denied funding if the service in issue is not 
covered by the public system. 
However, the law protects individuals from discrimination that, 
while not obvious on the face of the statute in question, is apparent 
following deeper and more probing scrutiny of the statute.46 If, 
on closer examination, it becomes apparent that patients with rare 
diseases are disproportionately denied funding for medical services 
or disproportionately aff ected by denial of funding, then diff erential 
treatment is established. Such a conclusion may be reached by evidence 
illustrating how insuffi  cient fi nancing negatively impacts patients with 
rare diseases; patients may demonstrate that, without government 
funding, they cannot aff ord the treatment in issue, and, without that 
treatment, their pain and suff ering is increased or their life expectancy 
shortened. On this point, if the scientifi c evidence is inconclusive on the 
matter of a therapy’s eff ectiveness, patients seeking these experimental 
treatments may be unable to tender compelling evidence that their 
physical pain is increased by the denial of coverage for that treatment. 
However, that is not the end of the matter, as these patients could 
underscore the emotional burden of being denied hope that experimental 
treatments off er. To establish that the law “create[s] a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping,” patients with rare diseases 
may point to the economic disadvantage they shoulder by paying out-
of-pocket for medical expenses. Th is burden increases the economic 
hardship on patients who may already be off  work as a result of illness. 
Being denied access to treatment may also add to the sense of exclusion 
and stigmatization already experienced by patients with rare diseases.47  
If an infringement is established, the burden shifts to the government 
to prove that the breach can be justifi ed under section 1 of the Charter.48 
46. Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 (“[a]dverse eff ect discrimination occurs when 
a law, rule or practice is facially neutral but has a disproportionate impact on a 
group because of a particular characteristic of that group” at 586-87).
47. See e.g. Fatma Ilknur Cinar et al, “Living with Scleroderma: Patients’ 
Perspectives, a Phenomenological Study” (2012) 32:11 Rheumatology 
International 3573 at 3576.
48. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
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An infringement is defensible if the legislative objective is “pressing and 
substantial,” the chosen course is rationally connected to that objective, 
the injury to the right is small, and the infringement is proportionate 
to the benefi t and eff ect of the impugned law.49 In the context of a 
section 15 challenge by a claimant with a rare disease, several factors 
will be relevant. At the section 1 stage, courts tend to show deference to 
government decisions that require balancing multiple and varied interests 
or allotting limited resources.50 Health care coverage decisions appear to 
be the sort of decision that will generally attract deference. Because courts 
require that the government establish an evidential basis for its impugned 
action,51 a government will not simply be able to assert that its action 
achieves health care objectives and meets the other section 1 requirements 
without furnishing evidence.52 However, as von Tigerstrom points out, it 
may be challenging for courts to evaluate the evidence put forward by the 
government: Are purported fi nancial worries genuine or is cost used to 
shield a discriminatory decision?53 And when does cost justify a decision 
not to cover a certain treatment? Must it be too expensive for the public 
system to absorb, or is it enough that the government has decided to fund 
procedure x over treatment y, both being equally medically eff ective?54
Two Supreme Court of Canada cases will be relevant to any claim 
brought under section 15.55 In Eldridge v British Columbia,56 the Court 
found that the failure of hospitals to provide sign-language services for 
hearing-impaired patients was a violation of section 15.57 In fi nding that 
the government’s decision constituted discrimination, Justice La Forest 
49. Ibid.
50. See e.g. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, [1989] 1 SCR 927 at para 74.
51. See e.g. Chaoulli, supra note 35.
52. Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26 at 6.
53. Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Human Rights and Health Care Reform: A Canadian 
Perspective” in Timothy A Caulfi eld & Barbara von Tigerstrom, eds, Health Care 
Reform and the Law in Canada: Meeting the Challenge (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press, 2002) 157 at 171. 
54. Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26 at 7-8.
55. See also Shulman v College of Audiologists and Speech Language Pathologists of 
Ontario (2001), 155 OAC 171 (SC) (holding that the decision to remove a 
particular service from the public insurance plan did not violate s 15). 
56. [1997] 3 SCR 624.
57. Ibid.
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for the Court noted:
In order to receive the same quality of care, deaf persons must bear the burden of 
paying for the means to communicate with their health care providers, despite 
the fact that the system is intended to make ability to pay irrelevant … Once it 
is accepted that eff ective communication is an indispensable component of the 
delivery of medical services, it becomes much more diffi  cult to assert that the 
failure to ensure that deaf persons communicate eff ectively with their health 
care providers is not discriminatory.58  
One could conceivably argue that patients with rare diseases who do not 
obtain necessary treatment are not receiving “the same quality of care” as 
those patients with or without rare diseases who have access to publicly 
funded treatments. 
However, patients with rare diseases may fi nd it diffi  cult to establish 
an infringement of section 15 given the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Auton v British Columbia.59 In that case, families unsuccessfully argued 
that the government’s failure to provide therapy for their autistic children 
was discriminatory under section 15. In reaching its decision, the Court 
reviewed the provincial set-up, which distinguished between “core 
services” and “non-core services,” the fi rst being those made available 
by physicians and hospitals, and the second being those performed by 
other health care professionals and insured only if so stipulated in the 
regulations.60 Th e Court held that the therapy, being a “non-core service” 
provided by professionals not designated under the regulations, was not 
“a benefi t provided by law”61 as there was no legislative entitlement to 
it.62 Th e Court observed that “the legislative scheme does not promise 
that any Canadian will receive funding for all medically required 
treatment,”63 apparently even if the treatment is “essential to the health 
and medical treatment of an individual.”64 Th e Court also dismissed the 
suggestion that “the scheme itself [was] discriminatory,”65 fi nding that it 
58. Ibid at paras 71-72.
59. 2004 SCC 78 [Auton]; Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 29.
60. Auton, ibid at paras 30-37.
61. Ibid at paras 37, 47.
62. Ibid at paras 34-38. 
63. Ibid at para 35.
64. Ibid at para 13.
65. Ibid at para 39.
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was designed and intended to cover only some, not all, medical services.66 
Th us, “exclusion of particular non-core services cannot, without more, be 
viewed as an adverse distinction based on an enumerated ground.”67 As 
the Court’s conclusions in Auton make clear, the rigors of a section 15 
analysis will not be lessened even in the case of patients who argue that 
access to treatment is necessary for their health and wellbeing. 
Further, the Court held that once the position of the claimants 
in Auton was evaluated alongside the “appropriate comparator group” 
(e.g. persons without a “mental disability” desiring benefi cial but novel 
medical services), “diff erential treatment either directly or by eff ect [was] 
not established”68 as the evidence did not indicate that the government 
gave additional consideration to or was more likely to grant applications 
for unproven therapies made by persons in the comparator group.69 
Given the narrow characterization of the “comparator group” in Auton, 
the case would seem to preclude reliance on section 15 by persons 
seeking unproven treatments which are not included in the existing 
public insurance scheme, in the absence of evidence that other groups 
receive coverage for unproven therapies at greater rates. Th is reading of 
the case has signifi cant implications for patients with rare diseases, given 
that many rare diseases have no treatment and thus a signifi cant number 
of patients may desire to access unproven therapies.70 
66. Ibid at para 43.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid at para 58.
69. Ibid at paras 58-62.
70. M Ian Phillips, “Gene, Stem Cell, and Future Th erapies for Orphan Diseases” 
(2012) 92:2 Clinical Pharmacology & Th erapeutics 182 (“currently only ~5% 
of the approximately 7,000 rare diseases have therapies” at 182). Anecdotal 
stories suggest that some patients with rare diseases place their hopes in unproven 
therapies. See e.g. Katie Nelson, “Aidan Seeger, 6, needs help to fi ght rare brain 
disorder that destroys nerve cells”, New York Daily News (27 June 2011) online: 
New York Daily News <http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/aidan-
seeger-6-fi ght-rare-brain-disorder-destroys-nerve-cells-article-1.125738>; Nicole 
Service, “Parents hope experimental treatments will conquer daughter’s rare 
illness”, Daytona Beach News Journal (14 November 2008) 1C. See also Matilda 
Anderson, Elizabeth J Elliott & Yvonne A Zurynski, “Australian Families Living 
with Rare Disease: Experiences of Diagnosis, Health Service Use and Needs for 
Psychosocial Support” (2013) 8:22 Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases (epub)  
(some participants “perceiv[ed a] lack of access to drugs used overseas but not 
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Also relevant is the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 
Cameron v Nova Scotia.71 In that case, an infertile couple claimed that 
omission of ICSI from the provincial health plan discriminated on the 
basis of disability, as the plan covered IVF treatment for couples who 
suff ered only from female infertility and thus did not require ICSI.72 
Th e Court agreed that the policy was discriminatory, holding that denial 
of access to Medicare (“a cornerstone of social programs in Canada”73) 
reinforced the “vulnerability”74 and ostracism of infertile couples.75 
However, the Court found that the infringement was saved under 
section 1 of the Charter. As part of the section 1 analysis, the majority of 
the Court emphasized the importance of the purpose of the exclusion, 
namely ensuring “the best possible health care coverage to Nova Scotians 
in the context of limited fi nancial resources.”76 
Based on Auton and Cameron, it seems that patients bringing a 
section 15 challenge to establish that a government has an obligation to 
fund a particular treatment will face an uphill battle, as courts generally 
show great deference to decisions of this nature. However, that hill 
may be mounted in a case with the right set of facts, a strong evidential 
foundation establishing discrimination, and weak government arguments 
at the justifi cation stage. Additionally, equality jurisprudence appears to 
be undergoing transformation.77 As the Supreme Court further develops 
section 15 doctrine and principles – by, for example, moving away from 
the “comparator group” analysis – the likelihood of success of this type 
of claim increases. After all, the “comparator group” was one of the 
stumbling blocks in Auton. Without the “comparator group” hurdle, 
it will be easier for a claimant with a rare disease seeking unproven 
medication to establish the existence of “diff erential treatment.”
Even if a Charter challenge is not successful, there may be merit in 
approved in Australia” at 6).
71. (1999), 204 NSR (2d) 1 (CA), Chipman JA (Pugsley JA concurring); separate 
concurring judgment delivered by Bateman JA. 
72. Ibid at paras 170-72.
73. Ibid at para 206.
74. Ibid at para 194.
75. Ibid at paras 177-208. 
76. Ibid at paras 218, 225-45.
77. Kapp, supra note 43; Withler, supra note 43; Quebec v A, supra note 43.
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bringing such a claim. For example, Charter challenges hold government 
actors accountable by compelling them to produce evidence justifying 
their actions and decisions in the health care realm.78 Of course, these 
benefi ts need to be balanced against the potential costs (in terms of both 
money and time) of Charter litigation.79
B.  Administrative Law 
Patients with rare diseases may also consider using administrative law 
processes and procedures to challenge coverage decisions. Like Charter 
litigation, administrative law obliges governments to account for their 
actions and ensures that institutional decision-making is done in a fair 
and impartial manner.80 Administrative law may be preferable to Charter 
litigation, as it tends to be quicker and less expensive.
As noted above, some provincial administrative tribunals, like 
Ontario’s Health Services Review and Appeal Board,81 have limited 
authority to weigh in on health coverage decisions. For example, the 
Appeal Board can determine whether persons who contest denial of 
insurance are indeed covered under the provincial Act.82 Th e board is 
also empowered to make decisions on reimbursement for health care 
expenses incurred outside of Canada.83 However, the scope of the board’s 
78. Jackman, “Charter Review”, supra note 30; Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26; von 
Tigerstrom, supra note 52 at 178.
79. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 29.
80. Flood & Zimmerman, supra note 19 at 27.
81. Health Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c H.6, ss 20(1), 21; Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 18, Sch H, ss 
5, 6; Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26 at 12.
82. Health Insurance Act, ibid, s 20(1).
83. Ibid; RRO 1990, Reg 552, s 28.4(2) provides:
  Services that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital or health facility are
  prescribed as insured services if,
   (a) the service is generally accepted by the medical profession in
   Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical   
  circumstances as the insured person;
   (b) the service is medically necessary;
   (c) either,
    (i) the identical or equivalent service is not performed in  
   Ontario, or
    (ii) the identical or equivalent service is performed in  
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jurisdiction is limited, and it has no general authority to evaluate coverage 
decisions.84 
In addition to these administrative mechanisms, a patient may turn 
to the courts for judicial review of either the substantive decision (i.e. 
the decision to cover (or not) a particular medical service) or the process 
used to make that decision. Under the principles of administrative 
law, government decision-makers must act within the ambit of power 
bestowed upon them by statute and they must act in a way that is 
suffi  ciently fair and transparent. 85 
As discussed above, coverage decisions are made by numerous 
government actors, acting pursuant to statutory authority. Generally, 
coverage decisions are made by the provincial cabinet and Minister of 
Health, regional health boards, and other offi  cials within the provincial 
health department. 86 Judicial review is concerned with whether these 
   Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel  
   out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in   
   death or medically signifi cant irreversible tissue damage;
   (d) in the case of a hospital service or a service rendered in a health
   facility described in clause (a) of the defi nition of “health facility”
   in subsection (1), the service, if performed in Ontario, is one to
   which the insured person would be entitled without charge
   pursuant to section 7 in the case of an in-patient service or section
   8 in the case of an out-patient service; and
   (e) in the case of an in-patient service, in Ontario, the insured
   person would ordinarily have been admitted as an in-patient of a 
   public hospital to receive the service.
 See RS v Ontario (Health Insurance Plan), 2005 CanLII 77249 (ON HSARB), 
05-HIA-0148 (fi nding that sought treatment was experimental and thus 
not covered); Flora, supra note 42 (upholding decision of the board to deny 
reimbursement for experimental, life-saving treatment received outside of the 
country; provincial health care scheme does not cover all medical treatment, even 
if life-saving); Stein v Quebec (Regie de l’Assurance-maladie), [1999] RJQ 2416 
(SC) (overturning board’s decision to deny reimbursement for the cost of life-
saving medical treatment received out of country; decision not consistent with 
the purposes of health care scheme). 
84. Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, supra note 17 at 24-25.
85. Crevier v AG (Québec), [1981] 2 SCR 220; Baker v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 
2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
86. Katherine Cherniawsky, “Enforcement of Health Care Rights and Administrative 
Law” (1996) 4 Health LJ 35 at 45-46.
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bodies have properly acted within their jurisdiction and thus each case 
will require a detailed analysis of the governing statute and the action 
purportedly taken under it.87 General principles are canvassed below, 
but, of course, the old caveat rings particularly true in the context of 
administrative law: the outcome depends on the particular facts of the 
case.88 
In Lexogest Inc v Manitoba,89 the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
found that the Manitoba Heath Services Commission acted outside 
its jurisdiction by setting up a funding policy which covered abortion 
services if they were provided in hospitals, but not if they occurred in 
other health centres.90 While the Commission had legislative sanction 
to determine which services would be covered, it could not exercise this 
power arbitrarily.91 
Th e Ontario High Court of Justice in Re Koonar,92 dismissed an 
application brought by physiotherapists who sought review of the decision 
of the provincial health department to deny insurance coverage for their 
services.93 Th e Court found that “[t]he extent of that insurance was a 
policy decision, a legislative decision which is not subject to review.”94
In another case, following a decision by a government offi  cial to 
withdraw a particular drug from availability through the Special Access 
Programme (which provides an exceptional means for patients to access 
unapproved drugs), patients sought review on the grounds that the offi  cial 
acted outside the scope of his statutory authority.95 Th e Federal Court 
agreed, holding that the offi  cial had, by limiting his decision in advance 
and in a manner not consistent with the legislative purpose, unlawfully 
87. Sweatman & Woollard, supra note 18 at 283; Cherniawsky, ibid at 47.
88. Sweatman & Woollard, ibid; Cherniawsky, ibid. 
89. Lexogest Inc v Manitoba (Attorney General) (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 8 (CA).
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid, per Helper JA (Philp JA concurring). See also British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association v British Columbia (Attorney General) (1988), 49 DLR (4th) 
493 (BCSC); contra PEI (Minister of Health and Social Services) v Morgentaler 
(1996), 144 Nfl d & PEIR 263 (PEISC(AD)).  
92. Re Koonar and Minister of Health (1982), 133 DLR (3d) 396 (Ont HCJ).
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid at para 14.
95. Delisle v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FC 933. 
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fettered the broad discretion granted to him under the statute.96 
With that background set out, it is apposite to turn to the particular 
situation at hand, namely, an administrative-based challenge to a 
government decision to exclude from its insurance plan a treatment 
desired by a patient with a rare disease. First, a patient may consider 
challenging the procedure used to make the impugned decision. At 
common law, administrative actors owe a duty of procedural fairness to 
individuals whose rights or interests are aff ected by specifi c, individualized 
decisions.97 No duty is owed for general, policy decisions.98 Most often, 
decisions about which medical services should be funded will be policy 
decisions, involving the apportionment of resources among competing 
groups, and thus no duty of procedural fairness will attach. In some cases, 
a duty of procedural fairness may be owed to an individual if the decision 
is suffi  ciently particular to that individual. Th is would likely be the case 
for a patient who requests reimbursement for out-of-province treatment. 
While the content necessary to satisfy the duty of procedural fairness 
varies from case to case, it may require that the aff ected individual be 
given an opportunity to respond or to submit evidence for the decision-
maker’s consideration. However, as noted, for the most part, patients 
with rare diseases who as a group seek coverage for medications are likely 
not owed administrative procedural fairness protections. Th e government 
may, on its own initiative and without legal compulsion, seek input from 
patients with rare diseases in making health care coverage decisions, and 
indeed, certain processes have been recently put in place to facilitate 
public participation in these types of decisions.99
Second, a patient may challenge the substantive decision to include 
or exclude medical services from public insurance plans, by, for example, 
96. Ibid at paras 125-28, 167-69.
97. Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 SCR 602; Cardinal v Director 
of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643; Knight v Indian Head School Division No 
19, [1990] 1 SCR 653.
98. Canada v Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 SCR 735.
99. For a comment on how procedural fairness faired under the Common Drug 
Review, see Attaran, supra note 25 at 13-14. Since publication of Attaran’s 
article, the Common Drug Review has created a mechanism to enable 
patient involvement: Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 
(CADTH), “Patient Input” (2013), online: CADTH <http://www.cadth.ca>.
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arguing that the decision-maker erred in giving weight to irrelevant 
considerations or misconstrued relevant evidence. A court must 
determine the governing standard of review, being either “correctness” 
(whereby the court embarks on a fresh assessment of the matter) or 
“reasonableness” (the more deferential standard, which asks “whether 
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which 
are defensible in respect of the facts and law”).100 If a board is granted 
considerable discretion under its enabling statute and it is deciding a 
question within its domain of expertise, its judgment will often be shown 
deference by the reviewing court.101 Th is will frequently be the case for 
health coverage decisions, as many statutes grant power to administrative 
actors in general terms which impute signifi cant discretion to the body 
in question.102 However, as noted above, outcomes in administrative 
law depend heavily on the context and the statute in issue, and thus the 
matter will turn on the particulars of the statute. 
C.  Human Rights Legislation
Canadian human rights legislation guarantees protection from 
discrimination in the provision of public services.103 Patients with rare 
diseases may seek to use human rights legislation to contest decisions that 
have the eff ect of denying them access to health care services. While it 
appears that no recorded cases have considered human rights legislation 
100. Dunsmuir, supra note 85 at para 47. 
101. Sweatman & Woollard, supra note 18 at 283; Maple Lodge Farms v Government 
of Canada, [1982] 2 SCR 2; Cherniawsky, supra note 86 at 60-61.
102. Sweatman & Wollard, ibid; Cherniawsky, ibid.
103. See e.g. Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 8(1):
  A person must not, without a bona fi de and reasonable justifi cation,
   (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service
   or facility customarily available to the public, or
   (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any
   accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the  
  public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin,   
  religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability,  
  sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. 
 See also Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How the 
Human Rights Codes Overtook the Charter in Canadian Government Services 
Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 103 at 104.
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in the context of patients with rare diseases seeking treatment, this avenue 
has been successful in analogous situations, and thus a review of cases 
sheds light on how courts may decide claims brought by patients with 
rare diseases. 
Human rights legislation has been successfully relied upon by trans-
persons seeking public insurance coverage for sex reassignment surgery. 
In Waters v British Columbia,104 the BC Human Rights Tribunal found 
that the provincial health plan, which paid for vaginoplasty for trans-
women but did not cover the whole cost of phalloplasty for trans-men, 
was discriminatory.105 Similarly, in Hogan v Ontario, 106 a majority of the 
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal held that the government’s decisions to 
remove sex reassignment surgery from the list of funded services and not 
to extend stop-gap funding to cover the claimants who were in the midst 
of the procedure was a violation of the Human Rights Code,107 as the 
government had not established it was incapable of accommodating this 
group of claimants.108 Th e majority carefully noted that the government 
retained the power to make coverage decisions and to remove therapies 
from coverage.109 But, in this case, it was unacceptable for the government 
to “pull the plug” on claimants who were well into the process.110  
In two recent cases, male patients argued that provincial insurance 
plans, by covering screening for breast and uterine cancer but not 
covering screening for prostate cancer, discriminated on the basis of 
sex. Th e complaint was dismissed in both cases. In Armstrong v British 
Columbia,111 the BC Court of Appeal upheld the conclusion of the 
adjudicator who found that the coverage decision was not related to sex, 
104. Waters v BC (Ministry of Health Services), 2003 BCHRT 13.
105. Ibid at paras 180-85.
106. Hogan v Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care), 2006 HRTO 32 at 
paras 383, 389-465 [Hogan]. See also May v Ontario (Minister of Health and 
Long Term Care), 2011 HRTO 2179; C v BC (Ministry of Health), 2012 BCHRT 
47.
107. Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19.
108. Hogan, supra note 106 at paras 99, 106-09, 120.
109. Ibid at para 7.
110. Ibid at para 120.
111. Armstrong v British Columbia (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care), 2010 
BCCA 56, leave to appeal refused [2010] SCCA No 128.
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but rather based on medical effi  cacy, as prostate cancer screening, unlike 
breast and uterine cancer screening, was not proven to be eff ective.112 
Similarly, in Cochrane v Ontario,113 the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal 
found that the evidence did not prove that prostate cancer screening 
increased survival rates and thus, like in Armstrong, effi  cacy – not sex 
– was the motivation for the decision.114 In both cases, the adjudicative 
body tied coverage decisions to evidence of effi  cacy, perhaps cementing a 
requirement that coverage decisions be evidence-based. If the approach 
in Armstrong and Cochrane is followed in the future, it seems unlikely that 
courts will order that the government pay for experimental treatments 
that lack at least some evidence of medical effi  cacy. 
Th e BC Human Rights Tribunal similarly focused on evidence of 
effi  cacy in Turnbull v British Columbia.115 Under the provincial health 
plan, venous angioplasty was not covered for multiple sclerosis (MS), but 
was covered for other conditions.116 Turnbull argued that this constituted 
discrimination on the basis of disability, because the treatment would 
be covered if he had a diff erent disease instead of MS.117 Th e fact that 
the treatment was novel and untried for MS factored heavily into the 
tribunal’s decision to dismiss the complaint.118
In the well-known case of Canada v Buff ett,119 however, Buff ett 
successfully argued that the failure of the Canadian Forces to pay for 
in intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) for male service members 
while paying for in vitro infertilization (IVF) for female service members 
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and disability.120
Also relevant are decisions related to the obligation of governments to 
fund special programming for children with disabilities. In Moore v British 
112. Ibid at para 33.
113. Cochrane v Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care), 2010 HRTO 1477.
114. Ibid at paras 22, 24.
115. Turnbull v British Columbia (Ministry of Health Services), 2011 BCHRT 324.
116. Ibid at para 89.
117. Ibid at para 77.
118. Ibid at paras 80-88, 96-98.
119. Canada (Attorney General) v Buff ett, 2007 FC 1061.
120. Ibid at paras 48-64. See also Susan Krashinsky, “Funding Fertility: Th e Fight to 
Have Treatments Covered”, Th e Globe & Mail (19 August 2009) online: Globe 
& Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
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Columbia,121 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the province acted 
discriminatorily when it abolished special programming that benefi ted 
a child with a mental disability.122 Th e Court rejected the assertion by 
the province and the school district that their action was necessary to 
tackle a “budgetary crisis,”123 as “the cuts were disproportionably made to 
special needs programs”124 and no consideration was fi rst given to other 
ways in which the fi nancial crisis could be resolved.125 Extrapolating 
principles from this decision to the health care context, it would seem 
that, while budgetary considerations can justify delisting or excluding 
medical services from coverage, patients with rare diseases must not bear 
the brunt of fi nancial constraints. In other words, governments cannot 
justify coverage decisions based on economic arguments if those decisions 
disproportionately impact patients with rare diseases. 
As this brief review highlights, individuals have had mixed success 
in using human rights legislation to challenge governmental resource 
allocation decisions. For patients with rare diseases to make use of 
this tool, they must “demonstrate prima facie discrimination … [by] 
show[ing] that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination 
under the [relevant human rights] Code; that they experienced an adverse 
impact with respect to the service; and that the protected characteristic 
was a factor in the adverse impact.”126 Th eir eff orts in this regard will be 
furthered by the types of arguments and evidence recounted under the 
discussion of section 15 of the Charter. In order to establish that “the 
protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact,”127 patients 
may need to present evidence that the sought treatment is likely to be 
eff ective. If they are unable to do so, they may fail to prove that the 
impugned decision was in fact made on the basis of disability, rather than 
on the grounds that the therapy is not scientifi cally proven. 
121. Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]. See also 
Newfoundland and Labrador v Sparkes et al, 2004 NLSCTD 16.
122. Moore, ibid at para 48. 
123. Ibid at para 53.
124. Ibid at para 51. 
125. Ibid at paras 50-53.
126. Ibid at para 33.
127. Ibid.
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Th e government then has the onus of proving that denial of funding 
is justifi ed and may argue that budgetary constraints and the high cost 
of orphan drugs warrant the impugned action or decision. However, as 
the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Moore, “accommodation is not 
a question of ‘mere effi  ciency’, since ‘[i]t will always seem demonstrably 
cheaper to maintain the status quo and not eliminate a discriminatory 
barrier’.”128 Th e budgetary circumstances must be such that funding 
cannot reasonably be extended to cover the requested therapy without 
causing serious diffi  culties for the government. Given the exceptionally 
high cost of some orphan drugs, the government may be able to establish 
that it could not reasonably aff ord to cover these treatments. It should be 
noted, however, that data from Europe suggests that fees paid for orphan 
drugs constitute only a small fraction of the overall health budgets of 
many countries.129 Further, if the cost of the treatment is minor, the court 
may reject the government’s assertion that covering the cost of therapies 
for patients with rare diseases would be an unreasonable burden. 
D.  International Law
International covenants affi  rm that facilitating access to health care is a 
crucial component in attaining the overall wellbeing of all people. By 
way of example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including … medical care.”130 
Similarly, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Political Rights (ICESPR) recognizes “the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”131 Parties to the Covenant commit to “achieving progressively 
128. Ibid at para 50, citing Council of Canadians with Disabilities v VIA Rail Canada, 
2007 SCC 15 at para 225.
129. Carina Schey, Tsveta Milanova & Adam Hutchings, “Estimating the Budget 
Impact of Orphan Medicines in Europe: 2010-2020” (2011) 6:62 Orphanet 
Journal of Rare Diseases (epub) (“the cost [of orphan drugs], as a pro-portion of 
total pharmaceutical expenditure, is likely to plateau between 4%-5%” at 9). See 
also Tambuyzer, supra note 1.
130. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, 
Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948), Art 25(1).
131. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
341(2015) 1 CJCCL
the full realization” of this right, including “[t]he creation of conditions 
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness.”132 
Canada is a party to the ICESPR and thus has obligations under 
international law to fulfi ll the commitments made under that treaty. Th e 
ICESPR has not found its way into domestic implementing legislation, 
however. Th us, while it cannot ground a claim by a patient with a rare 
disease in Canadian courts, it does form part of the background in which 
judicial interpretation of domestic legislation in, say, an administrative 
or Charter case, occurs.133 Th e impact of international covenants is 
succinctly explained in a report to Parliament:
[W]hile unincorporated treaties do not necessarily alter Canadian domestic 
law, they can and do infl uence its interpretation.  A common law doctrine, 
which applies in Canada, holds that in interpreting legislation, courts should 
presume that Parliament intended to legislate in a manner consistent with its 
international treaty obligations … [I]t is clear that the courts can make use of 
international human rights law in interpretation.134 
Accordingly, patients with rare diseases cannot directly rely on 
the guarantees contained in international treaties. However, patients 
would be well advised to emphasize Canada’s international obligations 
if bringing claims under domestic legislation or the Charter, particularly 
given the generous scope of some provisions in international documents. 
For example, if the benchmark set out in the ICESPR were adopted 
by Canadian courts, then entitlement to many medical services would 
likely follow. Th ese services would include therapies that are necessary 
to extend life or ease pain, and also, arguably, experimental therapies 
that, while unproven, are reasonably anticipated by patients to have some 
positive eff ects. Th e latter category is suggested on the basis of the stress, 
1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 No 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976, 
accession by Canada 19 May 1976), Art 12.
132. Ibid, Arts 2, 12(1), 12(2)(d).
133. von Tigerstrom, supra note 52 at 160.
134. Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, chaired by the Honourable 
Raynell Andreychuk, Promises to Keep: Implementing Canada’s Human Rights 
Obligations (Ottawa: Parliament of Canada, 2001), online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/371/huma/rep/rep02dec01-e.
htm>. 
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disappointment and feelings of hopelessness associated with denial of 
funding for treatment (and thus, in eff ect, denial of treatment if costs 
make it unattainable). Th ese emotional responses should be taken into 
account when considering what services are necessary in order for patients 
to achieve the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” 
as provided for by the ICESPR.
E.  Tort Law
Tort law is another potential tool for patients seeking funding for desired 
medical services. Th is section addresses the issue of whether a patient 
who is unable to access treatment as a result of a government’s refusal 
to fund that treatment could claim against the government on grounds 
of negligence. Th is question considers the matter of resource allocation 
at the macro-level (i.e. the policy phase where “big picture” resource 
allocation decisions are made), as well as at the micro-level (i.e. everyday, 
individual decisions about how to make use of and expend resources). 
Th e discussion thus far has focused on legal claims brought to challenge 
the decision of governments or government actors, not individual 
physicians, though they too make a type of resource allocation decision at 
a patient’s bed-side when they decide whether to administer treatment. 135 
Th is section of the paper considers whether individual physicians and 
other health care providers who refuse to provide treatment in order 
to conserve system resources could be liable if the patient then suff ers 
harm.136 In other words, can physicians rely on what Caulfi eld calls the 
“cost-containment defence”?137  
At the macro-level of resource allocation, what use can be made of 
tort law to contest allocation decisions? In a recent review of Canadian 
jurisprudence, Lorian Hardcastle identifi es several types of claims 
that may be brought against the government: claims for mishandling 
pandemics; claims related to system management failures; and claims for 
135. See e.g. Timothy A Caulfi eld, “Malpractice in the Age of Health Care Reform” in 
Timothy A Caulfi eld & Barbara von Tigerstrom, eds, Health Care Reform and the 
Law in Canada: Meeting the Challenge (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
2002) 11 at 13, 21-24 [Caulfi eld, “Malpractice”].
136. Ibid at 24-26. See also Sweatman & Woollard, supra note 18.
137. Caulfi eld, “Malpractice”, supra note 135 at 24.
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deaths caused by long wait times. 138 A brief review of some of these cases 
is in order before a discussion of the probability that patients with rare 
diseases will succeed with system-level negligence claims.
Th e Ontario Court of Appeal has struck claims brought by patients 
and health care professionals who argued that the province failed to 
protect them and to manage the hospital system properly after they 
contracted communicable diseases.139 Th e Court soundly rejected the 
plaintiff s’ arguments in Eliopoulos Estate v Ontario (Minister of Health 
and Long-Term Care), observing:
[T]o impose a private law duty of care on the facts that have been pleaded here 
would create an unreasonable and undesirable burden on Ontario that would 
interfere with sound decision-making in the realm of public health. Public 
health priorities should be based on the general public interest. Public health 
authorities should be left to decide where to focus their attention and resources 
without the fear or threat of lawsuits.140
Similarly, the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed an application for 
the certifi cation of a class action brought by cancer patients who accused 
the government and hospitals of negligently delaying their treatment.141 
Th e clear policy nature of the decision did not warrant allowing the claim 
to proceed.142
In contrast, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Heaslip Estate v Mansfi eld 
Ski Club 143 declined to strike the claim of plaintiff s who argued that 
the government acted negligently by failing to send air-based medical 
support to transport an injured teenager, contrary to the government’s 
own guidelines.144 Th e Court believed that the situation fell within the 
138. Lorian Hardcastle, “Government Tort Liability for Negligence in the Health 
Sector: A Critique of the Canadian Jurisprudence” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s LJ 525 
at 546.
139. Williams v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 378 at para 7; Jamal Estate v Scarborough 
Hospital, 2009 ONCA 376 at para 9; Abarquez v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 374 
at para 23; Laroza Estate v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 373 at para 5; Henry Estate v 
Scarborough Hospital, 2009 ONCA 375; Hardcastle, supra note 138 at 546-47.  
140. (2006), 82 OR (3d) 321 (CA) at para 33 [Eliopoulos Estate]; Hardcastle, supra 
note 138 at 546-47.
141. Cilinger v Quebec, [2004] RJQ 2943 (CA); Hardcastle, supra note 138 at 548.
142. Cilinger, ibid at para 16. 
143. 2009 ONCA 594 [Heaslip].
144. Ibid at paras 1, 2, 17, 23-28, 31, 35; Hardcastle, supra note 138 at 548.
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pre-existing class of duties which entailed liability if “a public authority 
… negligent[ly] fail[ed] to act in accordance with an established policy 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to do so will cause physical 
harm to the plaintiff .”145 Th e Court added that a duty could be found 
on an Anns negligence analysis.146 Th e Court distinguished the type 
of government decisions that are immune from liability due to policy 
considerations from the claim before it, as this claim was “based upon 
the negligent failure to respond to a specifi c request for a service that is 
being provided under an established policy” rather than a challenge to 
the development of general policy.147
Th is review of cases suggests that tort law is not a promising prospect 
for patients with rare diseases who seek to challenge government health 
care allocation decisions. As Hardcastle notes, many of these cases are 
decided at the duty stage, and courts have been unwilling to fi nd the 
requisite proximity between the plaintiff s and the defendant governments 
or hospitals which is necessary to base a duty of care.148 Chief Justice 
McLachlin explained the proximity requirement in Hill v Hamilton-
Wentworth Regional Police Services Board as follows: 
Th e most basic factor upon which the proximity analysis fi xes is whether 
there is a relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the victim, usually 
described by the words “close and direct”. Th is factor is not concerned with 
how intimate the plaintiff  and defendant were or with their physical proximity, 
so much as with whether the actions of the alleged wrongdoer have a close or 
direct eff ect on the victim, such that the wrongdoer ought to have had the 
victim in mind as a person potentially harmed. A suffi  ciently close and direct 
connection between the actions of the wrongdoer and the victim may exist 
where there is a personal relationship between alleged wrongdoer and victim. 
However, it may also exist where there is no personal relationship between the 
victim and wrongdoer.149
Undoubtedly, government decisions about what medical services to 
fund or not fund will deeply and signifi cantly impact some individuals. 
However, it seems unlikely that courts would expect the government to 
145. Heaslip, supra note 143 at para 21.
146. Ibid at paras 23-31.
147. Ibid at para 29.
148. Hardcastle, supra note 138 at 554, 556-58. 
149. 2007 SCC 41 at para 29 [Hill]. See also Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 at paras 
23-26, 32 [Cooper].
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have individual patients “in mind” as “person[s] potentially harmed.” In 
a general sort of way, the government will expect that its decisions in 
the health care realm will aff ect people’s lives, but, generally, it will not 
anticipate the specifi c harms that may result or the particular persons (or 
groups of persons) that will be impacted. Unlike in Hill, where police were 
found to be adequately proximate to an individual suspect to ground a 
duty of care, no patient is “singled out”150 or “particularized”151 when the 
government makes general health coverage decisions. Th e government 
is dealing with – to use the language from Hill – “the universe of all 
potential”152 patients.
Even if plaintiff s establish proximity, a court may fi nd that the duty 
should be abrogated for policy reasons under the second branch of the 
Anns test.153 In Hill, McLachlin CJC explained that “the fi nal stage of 
Anns is concerned with ‘residual policy considerations’ which ‘are not 
concerned with the relationship between the parties, but with the eff ect 
of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system 
and society more generally’.”154 For example, under the “residual policy 
consideration” criterion, a court should ask whether there is “potential 
for confl ict between a duty of care in negligence and other duties owed 
by”155 the government, such as, “duties [owed] to the public at large.”156 
Th is concern motivated the Ontario Court of Appeal in Eliopoulos Estate 
(discussed above) to hold that “impos[ing] a private law duty … would 
create an unreasonable and undesirable burden … that would interfere 
with sound decision-making in the realm of public health.”157 Courts 
are likely to fi nd that duties to individual persons are inconsistent with 
the government’s overarching responsibility to provide a cost-eff ective, 
reliable and fair health care system. Courts will thus “negate” the duty 
on the basis of policy-related worries that the imposition of such an 
150. Hill, ibid at para 33.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Hardcastle, supra note 138 at 555-570; Cooper, supra note 150 at para 38.
154. Hill, supra note 149 at para 31, citing Cooper, ibid at para 37.
155. Hill, ibid at para 48.
156. Ibid at para 130.
157. Eliopoulos Estate, supra note 140 at para 33.
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obligation would unduly interfere with the government’s discretion 
to allocate resources in a manner it believes best meets the needs and 
expectations of all Canadians.
Additionally, it must be noted that, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Just, 158 governments are not liable for “true policy 
decisions”159 that “involve or are dictated by fi nancial, economic, social 
or political factors or constraints.”160 Health care coverage decisions, as 
they involve resource distribution and fi nancial wrangling, are likely the 
type of decision for which a government will not be liable. 
Th us, for patients with rare diseases, the policy hurdles to establishing 
a duty of care will be diffi  cult to overcome. A patient would need to 
establish that the impugned decision is in fact an “operational decision” 
which executes established policy.161 One could attempt to characterize the 
decision to deliver accessible, high-quality health care a “policy decision” 
and choices about individual services “operational decisions” made in the 
course of realizing that policy. Th is approach may avoid running afoul 
of the Supreme Court’s observation that, “[a]s a general rule, decisions 
concerning budgetary allotments for departments or government 
agencies will be classifi ed as policy decisions,”162 because funding (or not 
funding) individual services may not implicate larger budgetary decisions 
if the “operational decisions” are made by “lower level”163 actors within 
the parameters – including ultimate fi nancial constraints – of the policy. 
Th at is, the decision regarding how much money to allocate to overall 
health spending may be a “policy decision” immune from liability, but, 
provided the budget is not exceeded, decisions about how to spend 
that money (on treatment x and not treatment y) may be “operational 
decisions.” However, based on Canadian case law,164 this approach, in 
158. Just v British Columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228 [Just].
159. Ibid at 1239.
160. Ibid at 1242, citing Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985), 60 ALR 1 
(HCA). See also Sweatman & Woollard, supra note 18 at 287.
161. Just, supra note 159 at 1239-40.
162. Ibid at 1245.
163. Ibid at 1243 (“a true policy decision may be made at a lower level provided that 
the government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision in light of the 
surrounding circumstances”).
164. See e.g. Gosselin v Moose Jaw (1997), 155 DLR (4th) 374 paras 15-25 (SKCA); 
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so far as it seeks to challenge listing and delisting decisions, is unlikely 
to fi nd favour before the courts unless and until courts perceive “money 
decisions” to be operational ones. 
Turning to micro-level decision-making, physicians and other 
medical service providers are unlikely to escape liability for malpractice 
by arguing that fi scal restraints justifi ed their decision not to provide 
a particular service.165 In Law Estate v Simice,166 the British Columbia 
Supreme Court rejected the physician’s defence that he did not send the 
patient for a CT scan because of monetary restrictions.167 Th e Court 
noted: “if it comes to a choice between a physician’s responsibility to his 
or her individual patient and his or her responsibility to the medicare 
system overall, the former must take precedence in a case such as this.”168 
Th e Court observed that the physical harm to the patient is “far greater 
than the fi nancial harm” to the system.169 
Th is line of reasoning will be useful if a patient with a rare disease 
is denied an expensive treatment by a physician on the basis of cost 
considerations. However, it is unclear whether this scenario is common170 
and thus Simice may not be particularly helpful for patients with rare 
diseases. 
A lawsuit pursued against an individual physician will require 
consideration of whether the physician has met the requisite standard 
of care, which is assessed in comparison to “the conduct of a prudent 
Gobin v British Columbia, 2002 BCCA 373 at para 44.
165. Caulfi eld, “Malpractice”, supra note 135 at 24.
166. (1994), 21 CCLT (2d) 228 (BCSC).
167. Ibid at para 28. 
168. Ibid. 
169. Ibid; Caulfi eld, “Malpractice”, supra note 135 at 25-26.
170. But see e.g. Ezekiel J Emanuel & Andrew Steinmetz, “Will Physicians Lead on 
Controlling Health Care Costs?” (2013) 310:4 Journal of the American Medical 
Association 374 (“85% [of participant doctors] strongly or moderately agreed 
that trying to contain costs is the responsibility of every physician” at 375). For 
discussion on whether costly therapies can justifi ably be denied on the basis of 
resource shortages, see e.g. Dominic Wilkinson, “Which Newborn Infants are 
Too Expensive to Treat? Camosy and Rationing in Intensive Care” (2013) 39:8 
Journal of Medical Ethics 502; Dyfrig Hughes, “Rationing of Drugs for Rare 
Diseases” (2006) 24:4 Pharmacoeconomics 315.
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and diligent doctor in the same circumstances.”171 Th e effi  cacy of the 
sought drug may be relevant at this stage of the analysis. If, for example, 
the drug is experimental and unproven, a defendant physician can more 
easily establish that he or she acted “in accordance with the conduct of 
a prudent and diligent doctor in the same circumstances,”172 by arguing 
that his or her peers would be cautious about administering medication 
without the belief that the drug has at least some chance of benefi ting the 
patient. Th e fact that the patient has a rare disease – and not a common 
illness – may also be relevant to the determination of whether the health 
care provider has fallen below the standard of care. Some lower courts 
have found that the rare nature of an illness militates in favour of a 
fi nding that the defendant met the applicable standard, as physicians 
in the same setting with the same experience would not recognize the 
unusual disease.173 
 Even if claims against individual health care providers were likely to 
be successful, it should be added that tort law challenges to individual 
decision-makers may not be ideal from the perspective of patients with 
rare diseases as a group, as the individualized outcome in tort cases does 
not necessarily lead to the larger, policy change desired by many patients. 
As Caulfi eld notes:
[T]ort law is not the best tool for eff ectuating health care reform. Malpractice 
lawsuits are determined on a case-by-case basis. Th ey focus on the rights and 
legal duties of individual physicians and patients. And while the principles of 
tort law obviously have social utility, such as the compensation of patients who 
are injured by negligence, the rights and duties of patients and physicians are 
rarely subordinated to the needs of the broader health care system.174
While an individual patient may win his or her case, the larger group of 
patients is still left without access to treatment.
171. Ter Neuzen v Korn, [1995] 3 SCR 674 at para 33.
172. Ibid.
173. Hancock Estate v Hanton (2003), 344 AR 221 at paras 56, 84-93 (ABQB); 
Grennan Estate v Reddoch, 2002 YKCA 17 at paras 36, 48-49; Shannahan v 
Johnson, 2010 BCSC 700 at para 76.
174. Caulfi eld, “Malpractice”, supra note 134 at 12.
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IV.  Conclusion
Th is paper has discussed legal avenues that patients with rare diseases may 
pursue if they are dissatisfi ed with health care coverage decisions. Each 
of these avenues has distinct merits and obstacles. For example, Charter 
litigation is ideal for eff ecting policy change and may be embraced by 
plaintiff s who seek “big picture” change. However, it can be complicated, 
costly, and drag on for years. Tort law, administrative law, and human 
rights law off er individualized outcomes, and thus, while policy change is 
possible if the government is persuaded during or following litigation to 
amend its approach, these avenues will not necessarily result in increased 
funding or new approaches to decision-making. 
A common theme running through this review of cases is the policy-
heavy component of health care allocation decisions. One can expect 
that, in response to all types of claims, the government will put forward 
a defence which emphasizes the policy character of the decision. Policy 
aspects may be used to justify Charter infringements, militate against 
the fi nding of a duty of care, exempt decisions from procedural fairness 
requirements, and tilt the standard of judicial review to the deferential 
“reasonableness” standard. Courts frequently articulate the belief that 
policy making is best left to the government. Th us, health care coverage 
decisions, infused with policy and fi nancial considerations, are seen 
to be in the government’s wheelhouse. Judicial deference means that 
for patients with rare diseases it will be diffi  cult to use the above legal 
avenues to establish an entitlement to funding for a particular medical 
service.175 Deference is not absolute however; courts will intervene to 
ensure compliance with the Constitution or to correct a discriminatory 
decision. Whether a case is likely to be successful ultimately comes down 
to the individual facts of the case. 
Before choosing litigation, patients with rare diseases should be aware 
that these sorts of claims may impact decision-making in unintended 
ways. As Ries and Caulfi eld observe:
175. Flood & Zimmerman, supra note 19 at 27 (Flood and Zimmerman suggest that, 
because coverage decisions are often unsystematic and arbitrary, courts should 
not be quick to accept these decisions). 
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[S]ome of these mechanisms may undermine accountability by pushing 
complex policy decisions into courtrooms where attention will necessarily 
focus on the circumstances of individual litigants, perhaps to the exclusion of 
broader consideration of competing demands on public resources. In addition, 
successful claims may accord greater status to certain therapies by enshrining 
public funding for them as a fundamental human or constitutional right. As 
a result, governments may be compelled to reallocate funds to those specifi c 
services and reduce fi nancial support for other programs or services that have 
not been the subject of litigation.176
Patients with rare diseases are not one “group” of patients, but many 
groups of patients with diff erent health care needs. While patients who 
share an illness may understandably seek to “constitutionalize” funding 
for a particular treatment, this may not be the optimal approach once the 
welfare of all patients with rare diseases is taken into account. Th us, in 
addition to the practical hurdles discussed in this paper, strategic choices 
may deter patients from using the court system.
On the other hand, litigation has benefi ts. If successful, patients 
may free themselves from fi nancial hardship and associated stresses 
and worries. Further, even if a claim does not prevail in court, taking 
legal action may prompt governments to re-consider resource allocation 
decisions in the health sector, especially if lawsuits are combined with 
political pressure brought by patient groups.177 Th us legal mechanisms, 
even if unlikely to be successful, may be useful tools for patients with 
rare diseases seeking funding for medical treatments. Ultimately, patients 
must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of litigation, determine 
their ideal outcomes, assess their probability of success, and consider the 
possible consequences of the suit before they decide to pursue a claim. If 
they decide to proceed, this paper has off ered a brief summary of the legal 
mechanisms available to them. 
176. Ries & Caulfi eld, supra note 26 at 33.
177. Ibid at 9.
